Working Paper ‘Exit, voice and loyalty ’ in business to business markets by Keith Blois & Witney Ox Sz
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
‘Exit, voice and loyalty’ in business to business markets 
 
 
 
Keith Blois 
 
University of Lancaster and Templeton College, Oxford* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  exchanges; financial implications; loyalty; relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Contact address:   54 Newland Mill, 
           Witney, OX28 3SZ. 
  e-mail:          keith.blois@btinternet.com 
   2 
 
Abstract 
 
Hirschman (1970) uses an analytical discussion to consider how a customer may use 
‘voice’ or display ‘loyalty’ within an exchange situation rather than discontinue the 
exchange by ‘exiting’.  While his analysis provides valuable insights into customers’ 
behaviour towards their suppliers, the need for further development of his analysis 
when applied to business to business exchanges is considered and the potential of 
using ‘event analysis’ to provide insights into the dynamics of practical situations is 
discussed.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The IMP Group’s interaction approach does not necessarily imply that relationships 
of the type discussed under the broad heading of “business to business relationship 
marketing”  will  exist.    Nevertheless,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  concepts  of 
“commitment and trust”, which have been identified to be essential components of 
relationship  building  (Morgan  and  Hunt,  1994),  are  often  found  within  the 
interactions which are the central concern of the IMP Group and that examples of 
effective business to business relationship marketing are frequently found in the cases 
discussed by the IMP Group (e.g. Ford, 2002). 
 
Yet, it is important that basis for the on-going nature of many interactions is fully 
understood.    Indeed  observations  and  comments  on  the  benefits  of  business  to 
business  relationships  should  always  tempered  by  the  recognition  that  there  is 
fundamentally only one reason why a firm will enter into a relationship.  This is that a 
firm will only enter relationships because it perceives that by doing so will it be able 
to create greater value for itself than if it pursued a transactional approach to the 
exchange.  However, business circumstances are constantly changing and any firm 
will from time to time need to reassess the value that both its purchasing and its 
supply arrangements create for it.  Even in those cases where a customer and supplier 
have had a long-term close relationship, such reassessment may lead to changes that 
range from minor alterations in the detailed operation of the relationship through to its 
being ended. 
 
 
Hirschman’s analysis – an outline 
 
Hirschman (1970) uses a verbal analysis to consider the complex interplay between a 
customer’s willingness to: ‘exit from’
1; ‘use voice within’; and, ‘demonstrate loyalty 
to’ a relationship. He considers how the probability of a supplier recognizing the need 
to  remedy  a  deterioration  in  the  quality  of  its  product  offering  is  affected  by  the 
possibility of customers ‘exiting’ from the exchange but that ‘loyalty’ may delay the 
use of ‘exit’. 
  
Hirschman uses these terms as follows: 
 
‘Exit’ is where “The customer, who dissatisfied with the product of one firm, 
shifts to that of another,…” (p.15)
2 and he makes it clear in various places that   3 
‘exit’  is  moving  from  an  existing  supplier  to  one  of  its  competitors.    For 
example he refers to going “over to the competition” (p.30). 
 
‘Voice’ is defined “…as any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, 
an objectionable state of affairs…” (p.30).  ‘Voice’ might involve individual 
or collective action aimed at the supplying firm’s “management or to some 
authority  to  which  management  is  subordinate  or  through  general  protest 
addressed to anybody who cares to listen.” (p.4). 
 
The  ‘loyalty’  option  recognizes  that  a  customer  may  continue  to  purchase 
from a supplier “longer than they would ordinarily, in the hope or, rather the 
reasoned  expectation  that  improvement  or  reform  can  be  achieved  ‘from 
within’ ” (p.79).  Thus Hirschman suggests that, where ‘loyalty’ exists, the 
customer is “willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties 
of  an  improvement”  (p.77)  and  it  “holds  exit  at  bay  and  activates  voice” 
(p.78). 
 
Hirschman does not define the term ‘product’ but appears, as an economist, to be 
using  it  in  the  restricted  sense  of  the  physical  attributes  of  the  item  purchased.  
However, there seems to be nothing inherent in his argument which would make it 
inappropriate to use the term in the manner more typical of marketing writers.  That is 
where the product is made up of a bundle of attributes which “includes the functional 
utility of the goods, the product service that the manufacturer provides, the technical 
service  he  may  give  his  customers,  and  the  assurance  that  the  product  will  be 
delivered when and where it is needed and in the desired quantities.” (Corey, 1975)  
Thus this paper will use the term ‘product’ in this more comprehensive manner. 
 
Some  of  Hirschman’s  findings,  while  perhaps  not  counterintuitive,  do  provide 
unexpected insights.  For example his argument shows that, while the easy availability 
of  the  exit  option  makes  the  recourse  to  voice  less  likely,  “it  appears  that  the 
effectiveness
3  of  the  voice  mechanism  is  strengthened  by  the  possibility  of  exit.” 
(p.83).  Hirschman’s argument is that, if ‘exit’ is available, then a party is unlikely to 
take the trouble to express ‘voice’.  However, where the supplier believes that the exit 
option is available to a customer, then if the customer uses ‘voice’, it is more likely to 
be effective.  A specific circumstance where it seems that Hirschman feels that ‘voice’ 
will be particularly effective is where there are big buyers and he states: “Voice is 
most likely to function as an important mechanism in markets with few buyers or 
where a few buyers account for a significant proportion of total sales,…” (p.41) 
 
Hirschman demonstrates that a supplier’s recognition of the necessity of remedying 
any deterioration that its customers perceive in the quality of its offering will certainly 
be  affected  by  its  assessment  of  the  probability  of  its  customers  ‘exiting’.    His 
analysis  suggests  that  the  supplier  would  perceive  the  ‘exit’  of  a  customer  as 
something to be avoided.  This paper, though, will argue that there are circumstances 
where, rather than to respond to the customer’s voice, the supplier will prefer the 
customer to ‘exit’.  
 
Hirschman nuances his argument through the use of the concept of ‘loyalty’.  He 
argues  that  “the  likelihood  of  voice  increases  with  the  degree  of  loyalty”  (p.77).  
‘Loyalty’  he  argues    arises  when  a  customer  has  a  considerable  attachment  to  a   4 
product or an organization and in consequence will wish to influence the supplier 
rather than ‘exit’ - especially when the supplier moves in what the customer believes 
is the wrong direction with regard to their joint value enhancing activities.  He reasons 
that not only does ‘loyalty’ limit the tendency of customers to ‘exit’ when dissatisfied 
with the relationship but that loyal  customers  will remain in  a  relationship in the 
“reasoned expectation that improvement or reform can be achieved ‘from within’.” 
(p.79)  It is logical to assume that where a relationship exists then such “reasoned 
expectation” will enhanced.   
 
Hirschman points out that loyalty raises “the cost of exit” (p.80) for the customer and 
accepts that, if a supplier recognizes this, it may therefore take action to encourage 
such ‘loyalty’.  Indeed he would concur with the statement that suppliers: “…have an 
incentive to adopt strategies that make established customers unwilling to incur the 
time, trouble, and expense of collecting information from other suppliers.” (Okum, 
1981,  p.170)    However,  the  interesting  contradiction  arises  that,  if  a  supplier  can 
encourage a customer to be loyal, then this reduces the likelihood that the customer 
will consider ‘exit’ and thus the need for the supplier to respond to the customer’s 
‘voice’.   
 
 
Limitations of Hirschman’s analysis for business to business markets 
 
Although Hirschman recognizes that there are some markets “where a few buyers 
account for a significant proportion of total sales, …” (p.41), his work was primarily 
developed in the context of the behaviour of individual consumers.  Nevertheless, 
Hirschman’s analysis has been found to provide valuable insights into the dynamics 
that can arise within business to business interactions (e.g. Gassenheimer at al., 1998; 
Ping, 1997, Johnston et al., 2006; Johnston and Hausman, 2006; Kingshott, 2006).   
 
There are though two problems in seeking to apply Hirschman’s ideas to business to 
business exchanges.  First, Hirschman says little about the financial implications of 
decisions to exercise ‘exit’, ‘voice’ or ‘loyalty’.  For example, Hirschman assumes 
that customers confront a number of suppliers offering similar products.  So, if a 
consumer decides that its current supplier is unsatisfactory, then pursuing an ‘exit’ 
strategy involves nothing more radical than moving to an alternative supplier of a 
comparable product.  He appears to assume that ‘exit’ involves little cost, only stating 
that the costs of ‘exit’ may be substantial when ‘loyalty’, which he accepts includes 
such matters as the personal feelings of the management (p.39-40), exists. 
 
Hirschman states that a customer deciding whether to use the ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ option 
will  take  into  account  the  chances  of  it  persuading  the  supplier  to  respond  to  its 
‘voice’.    It  will  thus  be  judging  whether  it  is  worthwhile  exchanging  the  current 
known situation for the relative uncertainty of the consequences of ‘exit’.  However 
he does not explore what determines the “worthwhileness” of the situation.  To be 
able to do this the customer will also need to consider the probability of encountering 
the following financial effects: 
 
a/  The financial implications of using ‘voice’ successfully.  These are the 
costs of managerial time balanced by the benefits derived from the supplier’s 
changed behaviour.   5 
 
b/  The financial implications of demonstrating ‘loyalty’.  These are the costs 
of  managerial  time  balanced  by  the  benefits  gained  from  persuading  the 
supplier to change its behaviour.  The cost will be extended over a longer 
period than ‘a’ above and, after some period, the strategy will switch to either 
‘a’ above or to ‘c’ or ‘d’ below. 
 
c/  The financial implications of using  ‘voice’  unsuccessfully but not then 
‘exiting’
4.    These  include  the  cost  of  the  management  time  used  without 
achieving its objective.  Furthermore there is the risk of it becoming industry 
knowledge that it is a firm which has been unsuccessful in a negotiation. 
 
d/  The financial implications of ‘exit’.  The costs here include: the need to 
find an alternative supplier; the risk that the new supplier may be no more 
accommodating than the existing one; and, any costs of bedding down the 
smooth  running  of  the  new  relationship.    However  they  must  be  balanced 
against any benefits achieved by changing supplier. 
. 
A second limitation of Hirschman’s work, when applying it to business to business 
exchanges, is that it concentrates on the customer’s behaviour.  However, in business 
to business markets the supplier is as likely as the customer to initiate changes in its 
exchange activities.  For example, a supplier is as likely as a customer to decide to 
‘exit’ a relationship.  Yet Hirschman represents the supplier as merely responding to a 
customer’s behaviour, such as the threat of ‘exit’, rather than ever being the initiator 
of behaviour.  Furthermore, Hirschman does not explore in any detail the supplier’s 
response to a customer’s use of voice and its threat of ‘exit’.  He goes no further than 
to imply that a supplier is more likely to respond to a customer’s ‘voice’ if it believes 
that  the  customer’s  threat  of  ‘exit’  is  real,  suggesting  that  “it  appears  that  the 
effectiveness
3  of  the  voice  mechanism  is  strengthened  by  the  possibility  of  exit.” 
(p.83.).   He also fails to discuss any second order effects even though these, in the 
case of business to business exchanges, may be substantial. 
 
The supplier’s behaviour deserves more attention not least because it is reasonable to 
assume that any response to a customer’s ‘voice’ will result in the supplier incurring 
some  costs  against  which  it  must  set  any  benefits  that  it  believes  will  gain  as  a 
consequence.  Furthermore, as the examples below show, no matter how probable it 
seems to the supplier that the customer will ‘exit’, the supplier may believe that the 
financial implications of responding are so great that it cannot afford to respond to the 
customer’s ‘voice’.   
 
The  supplier,  when  determining  how  to  responds  to  the  customer’s  ‘voice’,  must 
therefore seek to assess the financial implications on itself: 
 
a/ of responding satisfactorily to the customer’s voice.  These will include the 
implementation  of  any  changes  sought  by  the  customer  plus  the  recurring 
costs resulting from these changes (for example, the consumer may be seeking 
a  lower  price  and/or  a  change  in  quality).    However  there  may  also  be 
significant second order issues.  For example, if the supplier responds to the 
customer’s ‘voice’ requesting, say, a lower price then, if the supplier accedes   6 
to  this,  there  will  be  the  risk  that  other  customers  will  demand  similar 
reductions.   
b/ of the customer demonstrating ‘loyalty’.  These arise (assuming that the 
supplier’s management does not totally ignore the customer) from the costs of 
management time in, at least, listening to the customer and explaining why it 
(the supplier) will not respond to the customer’s ‘voice’.  
 
c/ of not responding to the customer’s ‘voice’ yet the customer still does not 
‘exit’
4.  At the very least the customer will be dissatisfied with the outcome 
and there may consequently be a need for the supplier’s management to be 
especially sensitive to any further demands from this customer. 
 
d/ of the customer ‘exiting’.  These will primarily be the subsequent loss of 
revenue over a period of time.  Where the supplier has assets that are only 
used for supplying this specific customer then the financial implications will 
include the costs of lower than expected asset utilization.  There may also be 
second order effects.  For example, should the customer’s exit become public 
knowledge then there may be a negative impact on the supplier’s share price 
which can result in the attention of the supplier’s management being distracted 
by fears of take-overs, etc.  Furthermore other existing customers may see an 
opportunity to take advantage of a weakened supplier and any potential new 
customers may assume that they are negotiating with a weakened supplier. 
 
Table 1  The financial implications of exit, voice and loyalty 
 
Customer’s 
strategy 
Customer  Supplier 
Successful 
use of ‘voice’ 
Benefits arising from the 
successful use of voice less cost 
of management time in 
achieving it. 
Costs of management time and 
of implementing changes in 
response to ‘voice’ plus the 
recurring costs of these changes.   
Reactions of other customers.  
Demonstrate 
‘loyalty’ 
Belief that benefits will arise 
from the use of voice less cost 
of management time in 
achieving it. 
Costs of management time. 
Unsuccessful 
use of voice 
but no 
recourse to 
‘exit’ 
Cost of wasted management 
time.  
Loss of reputation in the market. 
Costs of management time.  
Costs of disaffected customer.  
‘Exit’  Benefits arising from dealing 
with new supplier less costs of 
management time finding new 
supplier and setting up new 
supply arrangements. 
Loss of revenue.  Costs of 
lowered asset utilization.  
Position as a supplier weakened 
due to public knowledge of loss 
of business.  
 
Note:  Items in italics are second-order effects. 
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By bringing together the financial implications of these strategies for the customer         
and  for  the  supplier  (see  Table  1)  it  is  possible  to  appreciate  that  the  supplier’s 
response to the customer is more complex than that implied by Hirschman.  Indeed it 
implies that this is an interactive situation in which the reaction of the supplier will be 
determined by its own assessment of the financial implications for it of each of the 
customer’s possible strategies.  For example a supplier may perceive that the financial 
implications  of  it  responding  to  the  customer’s  voice  are  far  more  onerous  than 
allowing the customer to ‘exit’ or for itself to exit the relationship.  It may then refuse 
to respond to the customer’s ’voice’ and accept that the relationship will terminate. 
 
 
Assessing the financial implications 
 
Little is known about the financial implications of the possibilities set out in Table 1.  
Indeed it would be a very fortunate researcher that gained the type of access to firms 
that will enable them to identify and measure these financial implications.  However, 
financial analysts use “event studies” (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) to estimate how a 
share price would have moved over some period in the absence of new information 
and then compare this to the actual price during which some event or information 
release occurred.  These studies are based on the efficient  market hypothesis that 
“securities’ pricing depends on investor expectations and that investors make good 
use of available information in forming these expectations.” (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992, p.467).   It is therefore possible in some cases to impute the relative importance 
of some of the entries in Table 1 through examination of their share price movements.  
For  example,  examination  of  the  movement  of  a  supplier’s  share  price  when  a 
customer’s  ‘exit’  has  become  public  knowledge  may  give  some  guide  as  to  the 
financial implications of ‘exit’ as the two illustrations below demonstrate.   
 
Tesco and Dairy Crest  In the summer of 2004 Tesco (the UK’s largest supermarket 
chain with approximately 30% of the UK market) was renegotiating its contracts with 
its three milk suppliers and in August 2004 it was announced that Tesco was not 
renewing its long-standing contract with Dairy Crest (one of the three largest UK 
suppliers of milk).  The contract was said to be worth £60 million a year and reduced 
Dairy Crest’s share of the milk sold in UK supermarkets from 26% to 18% and it was 
predicted its loss would reduce Dairy Crest’s profits by £12 million.  On the day that 
it was announced that it had lost the Tesco contract, Dairy Crest’s share price fell by 
18%  while  Tesco’s  share  price  rose  by  0.6%.    One  result  of  the  loss  of  Tesco’s 
business was the assessment of the financial market that, because Dairy Crest now 
had spare processing capacity, it would find itself in a weak position when seeking to 
negotiate contracts with other supermarkets to replace the Tesco business.  It was also 
assumed that this would also be the case when Dairy Crest renegotiated any other 
existing contracts. 
 
Tesco  and  Entertainment  UK  (EUK)  In  the  second  half  of  2005  Tesco  sought  to 
renegotiate the terms relating to the third year of a contract for EUK to supply all of 
its CDs and DVDs.  Sales to Tesco represented half of EUK’s turnover with a further 
40% coming from supplying Woolworths (EUK’s parent company).  Tesco argued 
that  there  had  been  deflation  in  the  market  for  entertainment  software  and  that  it 
therefore needed EUK to lower its prices.  As a result of extensive negotiations new   8 
terms were agreed.  However, EUK announced that the contract was now unprofitable 
and that during the final year of the contract the new terms would reduce its profits by 
at least an additional £10 million on an annual turnover of £450 million.  Furthermore, 
EUK stated that it did not, as a consequence of the renegotiation, expect there to be an 
agreement for an extension of the existing contract when it ended in February 2007.  
The seriousness of this situation for EUK was indicated by press comment such as: 
“Replacing Tesco, with its huge 30.5% share of Britain’s supermarket sales, will be 
all but impossible.” (Daily Mail, 2006, p.19). 
 
Woolworths, because of the significant impact of the changed contract on its profits, 
was obliged to issue a profit warning - that is a formal statement that earnings for a 
specified future period will fall short of current expectations. (Bulkley & Herrerias, 
2005, p.605).  This led to a 12% fall in Woolworths’ share price – the largest fall on 
the  London  Stock  Exchange  on  that  day  while  Tesco’s  shares  price  remained 
unchanged. 
 
 
Comment 
 
The examples of Dairy Crest and EUK are perhaps atypical in that they were both 
relatively  high  profile  ‘exit’  situations  for  two  reasons.    First,  both  were  large 
companies actively traded on the London Stock Exchange.  Second, any activity by 
Tesco, the UK’s largest retailer, which appears to disadvantage its suppliers or its 
customers, attracts considerable media attention.  This was so in the two above cases 
with newspapers headlines such as: “Tesco Tactics” and “Tesco shrinks  Woolies” 
appearing plus editorial comments to the effect that: “Tesco was labelled ‘King Kong’ 
for crushing its rivals” (Manning, 2006, p.52) and “Woolworths was all but screwed 
to the ground when it negotiated a three year deal with Tesco…” (Daily Mail, 2006, 
p.19). 
 
The implication of these two examples is that the financial consequences for both 
Dairy Crest and EUK of agreeing to the new terms that Tesco was seeking through 
the use of ‘voice’ would have been more adverse than those arising from Tesco’s 
‘exit’.  In other words both suppliers perceived that, given the new terms that Tesco 
was requiring them to meet, they would gain greater value outside the relationship 
than within it.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that, although the consequences for 
these  two  suppliers  of  Tesco  ‘exiting’  their  relationship  were  similar,  there  is  a 
fundamental difference in the type of product involved.  In the case of Dairy Crest the 
product was a commodity i.e. milk supplied in standard packs identical to those used 
by Tesco’s two other milk suppliers.  In comparison, EUK was Tesco’s sole provider 
of a unique supply service.   
 
What is significant is how asymmetrical the effect of Tesco’s ‘exit’ was, with Tesco 
suffering  no  impact  on  its  share  price  but  both  Woolworths  (as  EUK’s  parent 
company) and Dairy Crest both being considered as possible take-over targets in the 
aftermath of the large falls in their share prices.  From Tesco’s point of view the 
financial consequences of ‘exit’ were less severe than either ‘voice’ or ‘loyalty’ and in 
its pursuit of the ‘voice’ option Tesco would have been well aware of the importance 
of  its  contracts  for  both  Dairy  Crest  and  EUK  and  may  as  consequence,  and  as 
Hirschman’s  analysis  would  have  predicted,  have  anticipated  them  being  more   9 
responsive.  In considering the risks of the ‘exit’ option Tesco would have been aware 
that there were other potential suppliers of milk and that capacity in the milk industry 
was  far  from  tight.    It  would  therefore  probably  have  regarded  the  possibility  of 
‘exiting’ Dairy Crest as involving it in little risk.  In the EUK case, while Tesco had 
no immediately available alternative supplier, the dispute with EUK ocurred twelve 
months prior to the end of the contract.  This clearly gave Tesco plenty of time to find 
a new supplier and therefore was also seen as exposing it to little risk. 
 
What is also noteworthy is the existence of another asymmetry for, although both 
EUK  and  Dairy  Crest  did  later  gain  new  contracts  from  other  customers,  the 
announcements of these new contracts led to very small increases in their share prices 
in comparison with the falls which had followed from loss of Tesco’s business.  In 
Dairy Crest’s case this perhaps reflects the press comment that Dairy Crest would 
now need “to bid aggressively for new customers so at least the bulk of the lost Tesco 
profits have gone for good.” (Urry, 2004, p.24).  Similar comments followed, with an 
emphasis on the lower turnover involved rather than its profitability when, in January 
2007, EUK won a large contract that replaced most of the lost Tesco business.  In fact 
the contract was not quite as big as that with Tesco and was only achieved by buying 
out an independent wholesaler for £20 million. Indeed Woolworth’s share price rose 
by only 3% when the deal was announced. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Hirschman’s analysis of the relationship between ‘exit; voice and loyalty’ is powerful 
and has provided many useful insights into the interplay of these three strategies.  
However,  this  paper  has  suggested  that,  while  his  analysis  has  assumed  that  the 
supplier is relatively passive, within business to business markets this is often not the 
case.  The paper specifically suggests that: his analysis would benefit from giving 
more attention to the financial implications for both the customer and for the supplier 
of the other’s view of the choice between ‘exit, voice and loyalty’; that second-order 
effects may be significant and should be factored into the an analysis; and, that the use 
of ‘event studies’ may provide some insights into the financial implications for both 
customer and the supplier of the customer’s strategy.    In particular the paper does 
question Hirschman’s claim that: “Voice is most likely to function as an important 
mechanism  in  markets  with  few  buyers  or  where  a  few  buyers  account  for  a 
significant proportion of total sales, …” (p.41).  Indeed this paper suggests that, on the 
contrary,  allowing  a  customer  to  ‘exit’  may  sometimes  be  less  threatening  to  the 
supplier than responding to a customer’s ‘voice’.  
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1 Where words and phrases are in single inverted commas this is because they are being used in the 
specific manner used by Hirschman. 
 
2 All unattributed quotes are from Hirschman (1970). 
 
3  Italics in the original. 
 
4  As the definition of loyalty on p.3 makes clear, this is not the same as ‘loyalty’. 